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804 BLOTTER v. FARRELL [42 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 23084. In Bank. May 18, 1954.] 
FRANCIS C. BLOTTER et al., Appellants, v. CHARLES 
D. FARRELL, as Mayor, etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Municipal Corporations- Initiative and Referendum- Com-
pelling Election.-Petition for writ of mandate to compel city 
council to submit to electorate proposed redistricting ordi-
nance does not refer merely to original initiative petition 
signed by 11 per cent of voters calling for such election so as 
to come within Elec. Code, § 1712, relating to petitions signed 
by not less than 10 per cent of voters, rather than § 1711, 
relating to petitions signed by not less than 15 per cent of 
voters, but refers also to a supplemental initiative petition 
signed by more than 16 per cent of registered voters, where 
petition for writ of mandate complains both of inaction of 
council at meeting at which original initiative petition was 
presented and of inaction of council after a formal demand 
was made, on date following certification of supplemental peti-
tion, that mayor and council consider proposed ordinance and 
petition. 
[2] !d.-Initiative and Referendum-Petition-Supplemental Peti-
tion.-Elec. Code, § 1709, permitting a supplemental initiative 
petitioi1 when original one is insufficient, does not prohibit 
supplemental initiative petitions in other cases. 
[3] Statutes-Construction-Initiative and Referendum Statutes. 
-Power of initiative and referendum is exercise by people 
of power reserved to them and not exercise of a right granted 
to them, and hence statutory provisions dealing with refer-
endum should be afforded same liberal construction afforded 
election statutes generally. 
[ 4a, 4b] Municipal Corporations- Miscellaneous Powers- Power 
to Redistrict.-Gov. Code, §§ 34871, 34876, 35322, 35323, setting 
forth authority whereby a city of sixth class may be divided 
into councilmanic districts and whereby districts may be 
altered or new districts added when new territory is annexed 
to such city, containing no provision prohibiting redistricting, 
include, by necessary implication, the power to redistrict, 
periodical changes in such districts being essential to prevent 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 8] Municipal Corporations, § 256; 
[2] Municipal Corporations,§ 254; [3] Statutes,§ 20.5; [4] Munic-
ipal Corporations, § 111; [5, 7] Municipal Corporations, § 253; 
[6] Municipal Corporations, §§ 227, 228. 
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drastic population differences from destroying representative 
system of government. 
[5] !d.-Initiative and Referendum-Scope of Power.-An ordi-
nance proposed by electors of a city under the initiative law 
must constitute such legislation as legislative body of city 
has power to enact under the law granting, defining and limit-
ing powers of such body. 
[ 6] !d.-Ordinances-Amendment: Repeal.-The power to enact 
ordinances generally includes, by necessary implication, the 
power to amend or repeal them. 
[7] !d.-Initiative and Referendum-Scope of Power.-In view 
of fact that it is generally accepted that most forms of legis-
lation may be proposed, repealed or amended by proper exercise 
of the initiative and that under Elec. Code, § 1701,· any pro-
posed ordinance may be submitted to city council by petition 
filed with clerk of council after being signed by requisite 
number of voters, the proposed redistricting of councilmanic 
districts within a city of sixth class is available by way of 
initiative petition. 
[8] !d.-Initiative and Referendum-Compelling Election.-Where 
original and supplemental initiative petitions calling for special 
election for purpose of adopting proposed ordinance changing 
boundary lines of councilmanic districts of sixth class city 
were signed by more than 16 per cent of registered voters, a 
request was made that ordinance be submitted to immediate 
vote of people, and published notice of intention to circulate 
initiative petition provided that purpose of such circulation 
was to have placed on ballot a law providing for redistricting, 
city council was under a duty either to pass proposed ordi-
nance immediately or to call a special election for that purpose 
(see Elec. Code,§ 1711), and having refused to discharge that 
duty and to fix a proper time for election the council may be 
compelled to do so by mandamus. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of River-
side County. Thomas P. 0 'Donnell, Judge.* Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel submission of an ordi-
nance to vote of city electors. Judgment dismissing petition 
and judgment on the pleadings for defendants, reversed. 
[5] Character or subject matter of ordinance within operation 
of initiative or referendum, note, 122 A.L.R. 769. See, also, Cal. 
Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 229; Am.Jur., Municipal Cor-
porations, § 208 et seq. 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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IJeOIHJ.rd A Boek for AppcllantR. 
W. Uolegate, City Attorney 
, and ,Jerome ,J. Bunker, Assistant City At-
torney, for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.---Plaintiffs, who are citizens of the city of 
Palm Springs, appeal from a dismissal of their petition for 
\Hit of mandate and a judgment on the pleadings in favor 
of the defendants, Mayor Charles D. Farrell, the city council 
of the city of Palm Springs et al. 
During Pebruary and March of 1952, plaintiffs as citizens 
of the city of Palm Springs, circulated two initiative petitions 
in said city. These petitions, which called for a special election 
for the purpose of adopting a proposed ordinance changing 
the boundary lines of the councilmanic districts, were pre-
sented to the city council on or about March 26, 1952, and 
by it referred to a committee for study and recommendation. 
The council failed to act on the petitions, and on or about 
April 15, 1952, refused to snbmit the proposed ordinance 
to a vote of the electors or call an election for that purpose. 
Thereafter the plaintiffs commenced this proceeding to obtain 
a writ of mandate compelling the mayor and city council of 
the city of Palm Springs (hereinafter referred to as the de-
fendants) to submit the proposed ordinance to the vote of the 
city electors. 
'l'he record indicates that the city of Palm Springs, a city 
of the sixth class, was incorporated in April, 1938. That 
as a part of the petition for incorporation, and pursuant to 
section 852d of the Municipal Corporations Act (now covered 
by Gov. Code, § 34870 et seq.), the city was laid out in 
seyen councilmanic districts numbered one through seven. In 
their inception, these original districts each contained as nearly 
as possible the same voting strength. 
During the years following the city's incorporation, some 
of the councilmanic districts exprrienced a large increase in 
population ·while the population of other districts increased 
very little. As a result of these population chang·es, the voting 
strength of the various councilmanic districts became seriously 
disproportionate. The extent of this inequality may be illus-
trated by the fact that in 1951 over 5,000 of the city's in-
habitants resided in the first and second districts while the 
combined population of the fourth and seventh districts 
totaled less than 600 persons. This unequal distribution of 
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population and voting strength among the various council-
manic districts (as of October, 1951) gave the 1,046 registered · 
voters of the five smallest districts the power to elect five 
councilmen while the 1,978 registered voters of the two larg-
est districts could only elect two councilmen. 
In an effort to bring about a redistricting and to equalize 
the population of the various eouncilmanic districts, plaintiffs 
circulated the aforementioned initiative petitions, which were 
eventually signed by more than 16 per cent of the city's 
registered voters. The defendants refused to act on the peti-
tions and took the position that the city council was without 
authority to adopt an initiative ordinance for redistricting. 
Following this refusal_ to submit the proposed ordinance to 
a vote of the electors or to call an election for that purpose, 
plaintiffs commenced this proceeding to compel the defendants 
to act. Both plaintiffs and defendants moved for a judgment 
on the pleadings and after the oral arguments on said motions 
the trial court determined that the petition for writ of mandate 
failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
'l'he petition was dismissed and a judgment on the pleadings 
rendered in favor of the defendants. 
Defendants' argument that the initiative petition can only 
be considered as one containing the signatures of not less than 
10 per cent of the voters so as to come within section 17121 of 
the Elections Code rather than section 1711,2 is without merit. 
The argument of the defendants is based upon two separate 
grounds : First that the petition for writ of mandate only 
covered the original initiative petition and secondly that 
plaintiffs had no authority to file a suppemental initiative 
petition. 
[1] In support of their argument that the petition for 
writ of mandate only covered the original initiative petition, 
wu the initiative petition is signed by not less than ten per eent of 
the voters of the city, and the ordinance petitioned for is not required 
to be, or for any reason is not, ~uiHnittPd to the voters at a special 
eler.tion, and is not passed without dmnge by thr body, 
then the ordinnnee without alteration. shall he lJy the 
legislative body to the voters at the next regular municipal election." 
""If the initiative petition is signed by not less than fifteen per cent 
of the voters of the city aud eontains a request that the onlinance be 
snl>mitte<l immediately to a vo1<· of 0"• rwopJ,· ;11 :1 sp<·ei;d e];"ction. thPH 
the legislative body shall either: 
"(a) Pass the onlinanee withont aHeration at the reg·ubr meeting 
nt whieh it is presented and within teu days nfter it is prese11tcd. 
"(b) Immediately call a special election at which the ordinance, 
without alteration, shall be submitted to a vote of the voters of the 
city." 
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defendants pointed out that plaintiffs' original initiative 
petition was certified by the clerk on March 1952, to con-
tain the signatures of 11 per cent of the voters; that the 
supplemental initiative petition, bringing the number of 
sig·ners up to more than 16 per cent of the registered voters 
was not certified until March 1952; and that since Para-
graph XV of the petition for vvrit of mandate stated that 
the initiative petitions were submitted by the clerk to the 
council "on or about March 26, 1952" it conld only refer to 
the original initiative petition. It is thus argued that since 
the action of the city council complained of was the action 
taken on the 26th of March, only the original initiative peti-
tion was at issue and therefore section 1712 of the Elections 
Code rathe1· than section 1711 should be applicable. 
Defendants' reasoning fails to take into consideration 
Paragraph XVI of the petition for writ of mandate which 
provided in part that ''although formal demand was, on the 
15th day of April 1952 made on said Mayor and Council, 
the said Mayor and Council did fail, neglect and refuse to 
consider said proposed ordinance and petition and have re-
fused to submit the same to the vote of the electors. . . . '' 
Thus it appears that the petition for writ of mandate com-
plained not only of the inaction at the council meeting of 
March 26 but also of the inaction after the demand of April15, 
1952, and therefore the demand involved both the original 
and the supplemental initiative petitions. 
Defendants also argue that the Sllpplemental initiative peti-
tion was unauthorized by the Elections Code and therefore 
section 1711 of the Elections Code (regarding initiative peti-
tions which are signed by 15 per cent or more of the registered 
voters) is not applicable. This argument is based upon the 
fact that the original initiative petition containing the signa-
ture of 11 per cent of the voters was sufficient for the 
application of section 1712 and that therefore under section 
1709 of the Elections Code a supplemental petition was not 
authorized. Defendants cite no authority upon which to base 
such a contention but merely refer us to the code sPction. 
[2] Section 1709 provides that "If the clerk's certificate 
shows the petition to be insufficient, a supplemental petition, 
in form a duplicate of the original petition, bearing additional 
signatures. may be filed within ten days of the date of the 
certificate of insufficiency.'' This Rection permits a supple-
mental initiative petition when the original one is insufficient. 
'fhe wording is permissive and does not appear to prohibit 
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raJ ~s stated 
:Oomi~guez, 212 . Cal. .587,, · 593 [29f:) 
that . the. power o:f initiative and 
rej~er,en<tUln, as eJ>:ercised in this stat~, is the e~e'.t'<iise by the 
rfoSfYrved to them, al1d n\')t the. exercis~ 9f. a 
· . . . [Citat~on~:l For that te~son, and, 
nr<)te!~t people of this state in< the exere~~~ ,of 
.,."'<'"'.,.'"an statutory or chart<Jr ptovis,o:n 
be 8/fordeq the saDfe Iibetal 
c03J$t.rn<llac•n a:ttmw.erfl '"''"'"~""'' stat:pt•es generally." (S(le A!so 
[153 P. 985J.) 
Ih view the wording of section 1709jnd 
the ;rule oflibei'al constr;uction,, which . aJ:lplicable to :Statutes 
dealh!g with the initiative power, it w()uld appear Jliat plain,..,. 
tiliJ:rwere not prohibited from :filing·a. s.v.P~lementll!-1. initiatiV(l 
petition in the iustantcase, '.['he. net. result was. a :legaU;y 
sufii~ie;n:t init~ative petitioA conta,ining the signatures ~f.lJl()re 
tha:n 16 per cent of. the registered vt>ters of the Qity <>f P~tlm 
S)jl'ing~.. .. .· 
• O;n appeal pla,i11titrs contend that ilie. po~er pf the ele~torlil 
o(the city to district ineiu.aes, by ilnplication, . . pow-er to 
a:Qltind.or cJli:l,n,ge those districts; that.an ordinance p;rovid' 
for .a redistricting is a~ailable .by way .of initiativ-e; a!lil. 
the cf,t.r COU.4eil was under duty.to .. e~the! .Pa~s the: P~!!PO~~d 
ordina;nee. ()r submit ~t to. .· Y{)ter-s at. a. speciaJ electio;n, 
.J:n regard to the power to r~district, pl~i;ntiffs alleg~ . that 
it is based upon, sectil)ns 34871,. 34876,. 31)32~, . 36323 ~ 
Government Code~ .. SectioJ134871 f,)fthe.Goverument Q~e 
pro~i<les th~t . . . anrlJl:U:Uicipal ele;t;tion, or special ele.~tio~ 
ll~ld ~ol'. i;ha,t ];>11J;pose;. the Jegisiath;e boqy may suh.mit ·to 
tl:+e,el~ctors . .a.n otdinance prov-iding .for. the· (l'tection of D:l~fr\;­
.. b~~s of th.e1el3'islative hod;t by districts,'' . IJ udet the provi~ip'n,s 
Q;~.lb.i~st?ctif.!n.a.eity.qfthe.sixili class ivb.ich h~s hee;neJM~~g~ 
the nie:rnbers o;! its legislative b9dy :f;r'om the (lity at I;ar~ is 
aut~o,tized to: submit to. t])e el~cto;rs a11 ordmaMe Tfnder wlljt~h 
sl;tc}i D:letlJ.hers woulq be elected by distrtets; . Seetion34B'l;t3is 
prov-ides that w.here a city of the sixth class incorP()rl!ttes, tlfe. 
petitio;n for. il:l;coi"poration ma,y .. provide. for tP:e ¢I.e~~on ·tl:f 
mewbers of the legislative body by districts. By the ena:etmetit 
. ~('Inelusi~n ~f prnvisinhs in . petition. for f;neoFPtmtiio~ .·I£. th~.l)(lti~ 
tipn. fu.r ln.eQ')tpoFat:ion llf . .a sixth .class city J?l'<lvides fQt ~h~ e:leetio:l;l 
of memtters of zthe. legisltttive body by distri~ts .·and. includes substan-
tialJ.y the pl'!JVfliipns required to be melttlle.d i'li au Ol'din!>UCe J)l'QV:iding 
fnr sn(lfi. eleet~o;n, th.e membets shall be elect~ purl!ttant to thls tJ;itie16}1 
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of section 35322~ the I.Jegislature gave to cities of the sixth 
class authority to alter ordinance the boundaries of wards 
or to create additional wards ·where new territory is annexed 
to said city. ']'his is Eolloweu by seetion 3532~3 which provides 
that ''In altering the boundaries of wards, or creating new 
wards, eaeh ward shall contain, as nearly as possible, an equal 
number of inhabitants eligible to citizenship.'' 
[ 4a] In substance the foregoing sections set forth the 
authority whereby a city of the sixth class may be divided 
into councilmanic districts and whereby the districts may be 
altered or new districts added when new territory is annexed 
to such city. No other specific reference to redistricting is 
made. 
[5] It is well recognized that "an ordinance proposed by 
the electors of a county or city of this state, under the Initia-
tive Law must constitute such legislation as the legislative 
body of such county or city has the power to enact under the 
law granting, defining and limiting the powers of such body" 
(Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134, 140 [277 P. 308]), 
and therefore it must be determined whether any power or 
authority to redistrict existed. Granting that the power to 
divide a city into councilmanic districts is amply provided 
for under the foregoing sections, we are confronted with 
the problem of whether the power to district gives, by neces-
sary implication, the power to redistrict. To put it another 
way, does the power to legislate on a particular subject include 
the power to repeal or amend such legislation or must such 
power be specifically spelled out in each instance? 
In Foster v. Police Comrs., 102 Cal. 483, 489 [37 P. 763, 
41 Am.St.Rep. 194], this court stated that the power to 
legislate on a particular subject "necessarily includes the 
power to amend an existing regulation upon the same sub-
ject; ... '' In discussing the repeal of municipal legislation 
it has been stated that ''It will be presumed that an ordinance 
duly passed continues to exist, and the burden is upon one 
claiming a repeal to show it. However, it is clearly within 
the power of the council of a city to repeal any ordinance 
"'Territory annexed to city divided into wards: Alteration or addi-
tion of wards. Where territory is annexed to a city divided into wards, 
or to a city which later divides itself into wards, the legislative body, 
by ordinance, shall alter the boundaries of the city w:uds to il\clude 
the annexed territory in one or more wards adjoining the territory, 
or make one Ol" more arlclitional wards out of the annexed territory. 
The numher of wards shall not be iue\'eascd to exceed the number 
which the city i~ allowed by law." 
May 1954] BLOTTE·R v. FARRELL 
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passed by it which does not affect the contractual relation 
of the city." (18 Cal.Jur. 215.) 
[6] Frequently a municipal corporation is given the ex-
press power by charter or statute to make, repeal or amend 
ordinances; however, such is not necessary since ''it is the 
general rule that power to enact ordinances implies power, 
unless otherwise provided in the grant, to repeal them. It is 
patently obvious that the effectiveness of any legislative body 
would be entirely destroyed if the power to amend or repeal 
its legislative acts were taken away from it. . . . The power 
of repeal extends, generally speaking, to all ordimmees. In-
deed, a munieipal corporation cannot abridge its own legisla-
tive powers by the passage of irrevoeable ordinances .... 
Aecordingly, in the absence of a valid provision to the con-
trary, a munieipal council or assembly, having the power to 
legislate on, or exercise diseretionary or regulatory authority 
over, any given subject may exercise that power at will by 
enacting or repealing an ordinance in relation to the subject.'' 
(McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., vol. 6, § 21.10.) 
Thus it would appear that the power to legislate generally 
indudes, by neeessary implication, the power to amend or 
repeal existing legislation. This implied power to amend and 
repeal is espeeially necessary in regard to establishment of 
councilmanic boundaries sinee our democratic system of govern-
ment requires, whenever possible, elpmlity of representation. 
The problem of population equality among roleetion areas 
is not eonfined to state or national lewls, it exists whenever 
divisions of territory and population are made for the purpose 
of electing popular representatives. [4b] Thus as a neeessary 
consequenee of our democratic system of government, the 
councilmanie distriets must be changed periodically to pre-
vent drastic population differences from destroying the repre-
sentative system of government. In the instant case the 
Government Code contains no provision prohibiting redistrict-
ing, and, therefore, the specific power to district should, by 
necessary implication, include the power to redistrict. 
Granting that the power to redistrict does exist, it must 
be determined whether or not such proposed redistrieting 
legislation is available by way of initiative prtition. In thiR 
respect it should be noted that the power to t1istrict nnder 
sections 34871 and 34876 of the Government Code is given 
exclusively to the electors, while the power to distriet or 
redistrict nuder sections 35322 and 35323 (when new terri-
tory is annexed) is given clireetly to the city council and 
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indirectly to the electors under their initiative powers granted 
by the Constitution of California. It is therein provided 
that ''The initiative and referendum powers of the people 
are hereby further reserved to the electors of each county, 
city and county, city and town of the State to be exercised 
under such procedure as may be provided by law.'' (Cal. 
Const., art. IV, § 1.) 
It is generally accepted that most forms of legislation 
may be proposed, repealed or amended by the proper exercise 
of the initiative (see McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3c1 
ed., supm, vol. G, § 21.11) and under the provisions of section 
1701 of the Elections Code ''Any proposed ordinance may 
be submitted to the legislative body of the city by a petition 
filed with the clerk of the legislative body after being signed 
by not less than the number of voters specified in this chap-
ter .... " 
[7] In view of the foregoing authorities it appears that 
the power to redistrict did exist and that such legislation 
could be proposed by initiative petition. [8] The only re-
maining question is whether or not the city council was 
under any duty to call a special election, when requested to 
do so, for the purpose of submitting the proposed ordinance 
to the electors. Section 1711 of the Elections Code provides 
that ''If the initiative petition is signed by not less than 
fifteen per cent of the voters of the city and contains a request 
that the ordinance be submitted immediately to a vote of the 
people at a special election, then the legislative body shall 
either: (a) Pass the ordinance without alteration at the regu-
lar meeting at which it is presented and within ten days 
after it is presented. (b) Immediately call a special election 
at which the ordinance without alteration, shall be submitted 
to a vote of the voters of the city." In the case at bar, the 
original and supplemental initiative petitions were signed 
by more than 16 per cent of the registered voters; the request 
was made that the ordinance be submitted to an immediate 
vote of the people; and the published notice of intention to 
circulate the initiative petition provided that "the purpose 
of circulating this petition is to have placed upon a ballot 
at a special election to be held in this city, a law providing 
for redistricting. . . . " It would thus appear that the city 
council was under a duty to either pass the proposed ordinance 
immediately or to call a special election for that purpose. 
Where a city council refuses to discharge its duty and fix a 
proper time for the election, it may be compelled to do so by 
May BLOTTER v. FARRELL 
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mandamus. (See Locher v. Walsh, 17 Cal.A.pp. 727 [121 
P. 712] .) 
We conclude, therefore, that the power to redistrict did 
exist by necessary implication; that an initiative petition was 
a proper method of proposing such legislation; that the peti-
tion here involved was sufficient for that purpose ; and that 
when properly submitted the city council was under a duty 
to take immediate action. 
The judgment is therefore reversed. 
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and Bray, J. pro tem.,*1 
concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
It is of course conceded, as a general proposition, that an 
ordinance proposed by the electors of a city under the initia-
tive law mnst constitute such legislation as the legislative 
body has the power to enact. Conversely it is true that if 
the city council was without power to adopt the redistricting 
ordinance here involved it could not be compelled to do so 
through the medium of an initiative petition, and likewise 
would not be authorized to submit it to the electorate of the 
city for adoption. (Hurst v. City_of Burl·ingarne, 207 Cal. 134, 
140-141 [277 P. 308) .) 
In the present case the majority discover an irnplication 
in the provisions of the Government Code relating to the 
districting of cities to the effect that such cities also have 
the power to redistrict their territory. (Gov. Code, §§ 34871 
and 34876.) Those sections are contained in that part of the 
Government Code setting out the procedures and conditions 
under which a city of the sixth class may provide for the 
election of its legislative body by districts, either at the time 
of its incorporation or at a time after the city has functioned 
with a legislative body chosen at large. If it be true that 
those and other sections imply a power to redistrict, as held 
by the majority, then the mode and method prescribed by 
the Legislature for districting a city should be followed when 
redistricting is sought to be brought about. Such special 
procedures are in substance set forth in Government Code, 
section 3487 4, as follows: ''If three-fourths of the qualified 
electors of the City vote in favor of the ordinance [to district 
a city then functioning with a legislative body chosen at 
large], at the expiration of the terms of office of the members 
*Assigned by Chairman o:f Judicial Council. 
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of the legislativr: body or when a vacancy occurs, members 
of the legislative :shall be elected by districts." However, 
redistricting the as proposed by the ordinance in the 
present case vvould become valid and binding, if enacted 
nnder the initiative law, if "a majority of the voters ... vote 
in its favor," and it would "be considered as adopted upon 
the date that the vote is declared by the canvassing board, 
and shall go into effect ten days thereafter.'' (Elec. Code, 
§ 1715.) 'l1he discrepancies in procedure between the pro-
posed method of redistricting and the one provided for 
in the Government Code are obvious and substantial. The 
initiative process does not accord applicable procedural safe-
guards afforded by the special legislation on the particular 
subject. 
In Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, this 
court held invalid a zoning ordinance of the city of Bur-
lingame enacted by initiative. Procedural provisions of the 
Zoning Act of 1917 (Stats. 1917, p. 1419) had not been com-
plied with. The court stated at pages 140 and 141: "It is too 
clear for controversy that if the Board of Trustees of the 
City of Burlingame had adopted the ordinance in question 
without compliance with the requirements of the Zoning Act 
above outlined said ordinance would have been inoperative 
and void. It is equally clear that the infirmity would not be 
cured by the purported adoption of the ordinance by the 
electors of the City under the initiative law .... The Zoning 
Act is a special statute dealing with a particular subject 
and must be deemed to be controlling over the initiative, 
which is general in its scope.'' The failure to comply with 
the districting provisions of the Government Code by the 
method through vvhieh the defendant city is sought to be 
redistricted in the present case creates a situation which cannot 
be materially distinguished from that in the Hurst case, and 
there is no reason why the same principles of law should 
not apply. 
There is another good reason why the city council was 
not required to submit the proposed ordinance to the electorate. 
The effect of the ordinance, if enacted either by the council 
or under the initiative process, would be to oust the in-
cumbents from a portion of the districts they now represent, 
leave some areas with two councilmen and others with none, 
create confusion within the newly created districts as to the 
right of recall by electors therein, and reduce to an absurdity 
the residential requirements of both councilmen and electors. 
May 1954] BLOTTER V. FARRELL 
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This would east in doubt the validity of the status of the 
membership of the city council and any legislation or other 
official action of that body. It was never intended that an 
ordinance with the foregoing consequences could be passed 
by the council or be subject to the initiative process. In 
commenting· on the scope of the reservation to the people of 
the power to enact legislation by initiative, it has been cor-
rectly stated that consideration must be given to the conse-
quences of applying it to a particular act of legislation. Thus 
if it be found that the inevitable effect of direct legislation 
would be greatly to impair or wholly destroy the efficacy of 
some essential or indispensable governmental power, then in 
such case it is said that the courts may and should assume 
that the people intended no such result to flow from the 
application of those powers and that they do not so apply. 
(Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal.App. 561, 569-570 [153 P. 397] ; 
18 CaLJ ur. 946-947; see also Starbuck v. City of Fullerton, 
34 Cal.App. 683 [186 P. 583] .) 
The city council properly refused to pass or to submit to 
the electorate a provision which, if enacted, would not con-
stitute proper legislation (Hyde v. Wilde, 51 CaLApp. 82, 84 
[196 P. 118] ), and mandamus should not be invoked to 
compel the performance of an act when, as here, there is no 
duty to perform it. I would affirm the judgment. 
EDMONDS, J.-Admittedly, the Legislature has made no 
express provision for redistricting cities of the sixth class by 
an initiative measure, and to imply such a procedure, in my 
opinion, requires the court to reason from analogies which 
do not fit. 
The conclusion that such a procedure is a proper one 
appears to be based upon this reasoning: (1) certain.,pro-
visions of the Government Code permit the legislative body 
of the city to enact or submit to the voters measures relating 
to councilmanic districting; (2) as a general rule, the power 
to enact includes the power to amend or rep~al legislation; 
( 3) the initiative process includes those measures which the 
legislative body may enact. 
I do uot believe that a geueral power of redistricting 
properly may be impli(~d from the limited situations provided 
for disi.riei ing Lbe eity in the first instance. The situationl'l 
relied upon aR permitting districting are limited in number, 
and in each instance, a procedure is required which differs 
from that of the others. But in each case, the result is the 
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same-the city is divided into councilmanic districts. Ac-
cordingly, it is impossible to state, and the majority do not 
attempt to delineate, the exact basis and the proper procedure 
for implying a power to redistrict. 
It seems clear that the fault lies not in the failure of the 
Legislature to indicate clearly a method of redistricting, 
but in its failure to provide for such a procedure at all. 
Rather than to attempt to create such a procedure by judicial 
legislation, it would be preferable for the eourt to await the 
aetion of the Legislature to enact a measure for redistricting 
with the procedural safeguards it may deem appropriate. 
I would affirm the judgment. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 16, 
1954. Shenk, Acting C. ,J., and Edmonds, .T., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 23046. In Bank. May 25, 1954.] 
WALTER FRANKLYN GROSS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Criminal Law-Appeal-Decisions Appealable.-Inasmuch as 
W elf. & Inst. Code, § 5519, authorizes a person who has been 
committed as a sexual psychopath to have his condition reas-
certained at intervals of not less than six months, such re-
determination would be a proceeding after original commit-
ment substantially affecting rights of the paTty and original 
order of commitment, and on that basis an ordeT of court 
,.finding defendant to be still a sexual psychopath and ordering 
him committed to Department of Mental Hygiene for place-
ment at designated island could be appealable under Code Civ. 
PToc., § 963, which provides that an appeal may be taken from 
a superiOT couTt "judgment" enteTed in a "special proceeding" 
and "any special order made after final judgment." 
[2] !d.-Proceeding on Issue of Sex Psychopathy-Nature of Pro-
ceeding.-Sexual psychopathy proceedings are special pro-
ceedings of a civil natUTe which are collateral to criminal case. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, ~ 1053; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 236.1; [3] Criminal Law, § 1049; [ 4] CTiminal Law, §§ 1049, 
1053; [ 5] Courts, § 121; [ 6] Bail, § 1. 
